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So you imagine that you have found a fool who would sell you a registered serf for eighty kopecks? But excuse me, why do you call them
registered serfs? They have been dead a long time, all that remains of
them is some impalpable sound. However, not to prolong this conversation, I am prepared to go to a rouble and a half, but I can't give you
more. 1
I. INTRODUCTION
Kto vladeet chem'? Chto prinadlezhit komu? It is one of the questions most often heard in Russia today. It is asked by people about
their own principal dwellings. It is asked by workers who might want
* B.A., University of Colorado; M.A., Yale University; J.D., New York University. Assistant Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law.
1. NIKOLAi GOGOL, DEAD SOULS 118-19 (George Reavey trans., 1971).
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to buy the factories where they work. It is asked by shopworkers who
want to buy their shops. It is asked by government bureaucrats who
want to be sure that they get their share. It is asked by wealthy Russians who want to seize additional opportunities. And it is asked by
the hundreds of foreign businesses trying to establish themselves in
the former Soviet Union. Moreover, it is now apparent that the attempt preliminarily to address the question with a union treaty in the
summer of 1991 contributed to the atmosphere leading to the coup
attempt in August. Who owns what? What belongs to whom?
Knowing who owns what has suddenly become important in
Russia because of the dramatic economic and market reforms of the
Yeltsin government.2 Most of the reforms are well-known: a liberalization of prices, the introduction of profit and financial accountability, the creation of a free market in place of the command economy,
and an attempt to make the ruble a freely tradeable currency. The
transfer of property, especially productive property, from the state to
the private sector is at the heart of the reforms. The Yeltsin government's policy of privatization has created a scramble to find out who
owns what so that private sector buyers can find a profitable niche
and be integrated into the new economy.
President Yeltsin has charged Anatoly Chubais, Deputy Prime
Minister and Chairman of the State Property Committee (Goskomimushchestvo or GKI), and Dmitri Vasilyev, Deputy Chairman of
the GKI, with formulating some answers to the question "who owns
what" in the course of undertaking one of the largest privatization
schemes ever to occur. Notwithstanding its early efforts, the Yeltsin
government has come under extreme criticism, both at home and
abroad, for its failure to proceed quickly enough with a full-scale
privatization program. 3 Moreover, there is still a great deal of reluc2. Recently, the Russian Congress of People's Deputies, meeting in full session in Moscow, rejected President Yeltsin's acting Prime Minister, Yegor Gaidar, and agreed upon the
appointment of a new Prime Minister, Victor Chernomydrin. Serge Schmemann, Yeltsin
Abandons His PrincipalAideto PlacateRivals, N.Y. TiMES, Dec. 15, 1992, at Al. The replacement of acting Prime Minister Gaidar, the architect of the radical economic reforms that have
occurred in Russia, is viewed as a partial repudiation by the Congress of Peoples Deputies of
the content and style of the Yeltsin reforms. Id. Notwithstanding this setback to the Yeltsin
reforms, Prime Minister Chernomydrin has indicated an intent to continue the basic direction
of the reforms, but with less haste and with a greater regard for the impact on the average
Russian. Id. at Al, A7.
3. Marshall Goldman has recently criticized the Yeltsin government on these grounds.
He characterizes the failure to move quickly with privatization as "a major flaw of the Yeltsin
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tance to proceed with government plans to reform the system of land
ownership in Russia. Some, including Marshall Goldman, are en-

couraged, however, that the Russian government has begun to take
earnest actions to privatize certain sectors of the economy.

The first major privatization of small-scale enterprises took place
during the spring and summer of 1992 in the city of Nizhny

Novgorod.' About 300 such enterprises were auctioned to the highest
bidders5 and Nizhny Novgorod became a testing ground for the privatization program. Yegor Gaidar, President Boris Yeltsin's First Deputy Prime Minister and head of the government's economic reform
plan, along with Anatoly Chubais and Dmitri Vasilyev, attended the
first auction in Nizhny Novgorod. The Russian government hopes to
reproduce the successful aspects of the Nizhny Novgorod experience
throughout Russia, including in Moscow and St. Petersburg.

It is generally recognized that the "foundations of a market-based

economic system are property rights and private ownership." ' 6 The

purposes of this article are to (1) summarize the reforms that have
successfully introduced a scheme of private ownership in Russia, as
demonstrated by the Nizhny Novgorod experiment, and (2) discuss
those property rights that remain unclear. Accordingly, the second

and third parts of the article will explain how the Russians have addressed the question "who owns what" at the federal and local levels,
using for this purpose the reforms in Nizhny Novgorod.
The fourth part of the article will assume that the question of ownreforms" and adds, "at a minimum Yeltsin should have announced his plans for privatization
simultaneously with the price reform. Some critics in Russia argue it should have been announced in advance ....
[W]ithout prior or simultaneous privatization, new production was
bound to be slow." Marshall I. Goldman, Yeltsin's Reforms: Gorbachev II?, 88 FOREIGN
POL'Y 76, 83-84 (1992).
4. Nizhny Novgorod-formerly known as Gorky and the location of the internal exile of
Andrei Sakharov-is a city of about 1.5 million people on the Volga River. During the Soviet
years, the government had chosen to locate a number of defense-related industries there so the
city was generally off-limits to foreigners. The presence of so many high technology facilities
makes the city more attractive, however, from the standpoint of privatization. Also, because
of its size, a widespread infrastructure of retail and food concerns provides an abundance of
privatizable, small-scale enterprises.
5. According to information provided to the author by the mayor of Nizhny Novgorod,
Dmitri Ivanovich Bednyakov, a total of 296 privatization transactions had occurred by September 30, 1992. More than half of these sales involved retail stores and about one-fifth involved establishments in the food industry. Interview with Dmitri Ivanovich Bednyakov,
Mayor of the City of Nizhny Novgorod, in Charlotte, N.C. (Oct. 15, 1992).
6. Eduardo Borensztein & Manmohan S. Kumar, Proposalsfor Privatization in Eastern
Europe, 38 IMF STAFF PAPERS 300, 300 (1991).
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ership has been answered and will discuss the actual transfer of ownership from the state to the private sector. It will describe the
contractual relationships between the state and the new owner of the
privatized property. The Nizhny Novgorod program involving smallscale enterprises is again used as a model.
Part Five of the article will outline those problem areas that new
property owners might encounter. It will discuss select issues that
make the ownership transfers somewhat problematic. Is there a major inconsistency in the applicable property laws and the admittedly
temporary privatization framework? What legal protections exist
from government expropriation of the newly privatized property?
What powers does the state retain to interfere in the use and enjoyment of the business? To what extent can the state interfere in the
new owner's intended commercial use of the privatized property?
Can the new owner pledge the privatized property to secure a bank
loan or other credit? Finally, what rights do creditors, secured or
unsecured, have against the newly privatized property?
Since the age of Aleksandr Pushkin, Russia has been a singularly
literary culture. Events are framed in literature and literature may
control events. It is perhaps ironic that one of the great figures of
Russian literature managed to preoccupy himself with property issues
in a different context. Pavel Ivanovich Chichikov, the hero of Nikolai
Gogol's 1842 novel Dead Souls,7 wanders around the Russian countryside buying the souls of dead serfs. He naturally faces the property
issue of establishing clear title to the dead serfs. How meaningful is
the title issue in Dead Souls in view of the formidably evanescent
property itself?
Interestingly enough, Chichikov wants to use the property he has
acquired to secure a loan from one of the Czar's government agencies.
In the words of one of the foremost Gogol scholars, Chichikov had
amassed a rather "ambiguous capital (consisting only of words on paper: the mortgageable lists of the dead serfs he had bought)." 8 How
many Chichikovs are there in Russia today rushing to acquire such
"ambiguous capital?" What laws protect them? These questions take
on particular sensitivity because the Russian government views the
7. Note that the year of the first privatizations in Russia is also the 150th anniversary of
the publication of Dead Souls. Russians have been known to put great stock in such
coincidences.
8. DONALD FANGER, THE CREATION OF NIKOLAI GOGOL 181 (Cambridge 1979).
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privatization program as essential groundwork to ensuring that the
second Russian revolution will be irreversible. 9
II. FEDERAL REFORMS
A.

The Property Laws

The question "who owns what" presupposes another more basic
question: "What may be owned?" Very little personal property could
be owned in the Soviet Union. In fact, the concept of private property
captured the essence of all that the communists considered to be
wrong with capitalist societies.' 0 Consequently, the question "who
owns what" found an easy response under the old system: The state
owned nearly everything and certainly anything of consequence, such
as productive property. This principle had been enshrined in the Soviet Constitution itself and, a priori, in the Constitution of the Russian Federated Soviet Socialist Republic (RSFSR)."
Property relations began to change under the perestroika reforms of
President Mikhail Gorbachev. 12 Many in Russia believed, however,
that the changes were insufficient to overcome the economic backwardness of the country and support the newly evolving democratic
9. Note the first enumerated objective of the State Program of Privatization of State- and
Municipally-Owned Enterprises of the Russian Federation for 1992: "[T]o form a group of
private owners contributing to the emergence of a socially oriented market economy."
Vedomosti RSFSR (State Program of Privatization of State and Municipality Owned Enterprises of the Russian Federation for 1992] art. 1 (June 11, 1992), reprintedin THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN

FEDERATION, SMALL-SCALE PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA:

THE

NIZHNY NOVGOROD MODEL, ANNEXES 23-49 (International Finance Corp. 1992).
10. KONST. SSSR [Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the USSR] art. 13 (1977), reprinted in 8 MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS ENCYCLOPEDIA 8.150-152-81 (Kenneth R. Redden &
Linda L. Schlueter eds., 1991) (providing for limited ownership of personal property).
11. See KONST. SSSR [Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the USSR] art. 11 (1977),
reprinted in 8 MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS ENCYCLOPEDIA 8.150.152-81 (Kenneth R. Redden

& Linda L. Schlueter eds., 1991) (providing for state ownership of the means of production,

transport and communication, banking, etc.); KONST. RSFSR [Constitution (Fundamental

Law) of the RSFSR] art. 11 (1978), reprinted in Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Supplement, The Russian Federation, in 19 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 340 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1991) (containing state ownership provision
identical to Soviet Constitution). Article 11 of the Russian Constitution has since been
amended in part to permit greater flexibility in private ownership of productive property.

12. See Larisa Krasavchikova, Comments on the Law on Property in the Russian Soviet
Federated Socialist Republic, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 481, 481 n.3 (1992) (defining term "Perestroika"); Richard C. Schneider, Jr., Developments in Soviet Property Law 13 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 446, 446-47 (1990) (emphasizing Gorbachev's influence in promulgating legislative
reform of Soviet property laws).
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reforms. While Russia was still the RSFSR, the Russian Parliament,
acting under the putative shadow of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet
Union, enacted a law to begin broadening the concept of ownership in
Russia. The Law on Property in the RSFSR was officially enacted on
December 24, 1990.13 The law provided for new property14 rights and
deviated in dramatic respects from its Soviet correlative.
The Law on Property, which is now unambiguously the law of Russia due to the intervening change in Russia's status from Soviet republic to independent state, provides for ownership categories based on
whether the owner is a physical or legal person.15 Objects that may be
owned by citizens include "businesses, property complexes in the
sphere of the production of goods, services, trade, other spheres of
business activity, buildings, structures, equipment, means of transportation and other means of production" and "any other property of a
production, consumer, social, cultural or other nature .. ."16 In a
provision of broader application, "products of science ...

and other

products of creative activity" can be owned by Russian citizens. 17
Any of these objects of ownership may be contributed to the capital of
13. Vedomosti RSFSR [Law on Property in the RSFSR] (Dec. 24, 1990), reprinted in
THE PARKER SCHOOL OF FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE LAW, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, Rus-

SIA AND THE REPUBLICS-LEGAL MATERIALS (John N. Hazard & Vratislav Pechota eds.,
1992). The Law on Property in the RSFSR was enacted within one year after the Law on
Ownership in the USSR which was enacted by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on March 6,
1990. Vedomosti SSSR [Law on Ownership in the USSR] (Mar. 6, 1990), reprinted in BASIC
DOCUMENTS ON THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM 269-81 (W. E. Butler ed. & trans., 2d ed. 1991).
14. See generally Larisa Krasavchikova, Comments on the Law on Property in the Russian
Soviet FederatedSocialist Republic, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 481 (1993) (detailing aspects of Russian Federation's Law on Property in the RSFSR). See Richard C. Schneider, Jr., Developments in Soviet Property Law 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 446, 457-64 (1990) (discussing Soviet
Union's Law on Ownership). In enacting its Law on Property, the Russian Federation simply
ignored constitutional provisions which prohibited the enactment of laws contradictory to
those promulgated by the Soviet Union. Larisa Krasavchikova, Comments on the Law on
Property in the Russian Soviet FederatedSocialist Republic, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 481, 482-83
(1993).
15. See Vedomosti RSFSR [Law on Property in the RSFSR] arts. 9-16 (Dec. 24, 1990),
reprinted in THE PARKER SCHOOL OF FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE LAW, COLUMBIA UNI-

VERSITY, RUSSIA AND THE REPUBLICS-LEGAL MATERIALS (John N. Hazard & Vratislav
Pechota eds., 1992) (distinguishing between property rights of individuals and legal entities).
The Law on Property also provides for the ownership of property by the other necessary elements of society. See id. arts. 17-19 (defining property rights of social organizations); id. arts.
20-25 (defining state and municipal property rights); id. arts. 26-29 (defining property rights of
joint ventures, foreign citizens, organizations and governments).
16. Id. art. 10.
17. Id. art. 2, § 4.
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a Russian enterprise. 18
It is apparent from the text of the Law on Property that, with the
possible exception of major landholdings, no significant type of personal or productive property is barred from ownership to citizens or
enterprises.19 With the basis for ownership thus substantially broadened from that of the old Soviet command economy, the question
"who owns what" at last becomes meaningful. This is, in fact, the

threshold question to any privatization program. A potential buyer of
privatizeable assets will not settle for anything less than unambiguous
title.2 °
B.

The PrivatizationFramework

Notwithstanding the absence of a firm commitment under
Gorbachev to privatization, the RSFSR initiated its own privatization
program during the fateful summer of 1991. About six weeks before
the coup attempt, the Russian Parliament adopted the Law on Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises in the RSFSR.2 1 The Law
on Privatization structured the basic relationships between the GKI,
the republic and local committees on property management, 22 and the
various funds that would act as the sellers of state assets. It specifically required the RSFSR Council of Ministers to prepare a state
privatization program to supply the details left open by the law.2 3
The state privatization program will be discussed in more detail in
18. Id. art. 14.

19. See Vedomosti RSFSR [Law on Property in the RSFSR] art. 10, §§ 1,2 (Dec. 24,

1990), reprintedin THE PARKER SCHOOL OF FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE LAW, COLUMBIA
UNIVERSITY, RUSSIA AND THE REPUBLICS-LEGAL MATERIALS (John N. Hazard & Vratis-

lay Pechota eds., 1992) (providing for ownership of listed property without limitation).
20. ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE, LEGAL ASPECTS OF PRIVATIZATION IN INDUSTRY 5 (1992).
21. Vedomosti RSFSR [Law on the Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises in
the RSFSR] (July 3, 1991), reprinted in THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION,
SMALL-SCALE PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA: THE NIZHNY NOVGOROD MODEL, ANNEXES 1-

12 (International Finance Corp. 1992).
22. The governmental structure of Russia (formerly the RSFSR), requires the distinctions made in this article between the federal level and the republican and local levels. Russia
is composed of autonomous republics and localities that may adopt their own legislation and
interact on the federal level in ways that are similar to the federal system that exists in the
United States. The idea of locality in Russia may also be somewhat unfamiliar. It includes
governmental jurisdictions known as krai, oblast, autonomous oblast, autonomous area, and
the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg.
23. Vedomosti RSFSR [Law on the Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises in
the RSFSR] art. 3, § 1 (July 3, 1991), reprintedin THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FED-
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the context of the Nizhny Novgorod privatization. However, the consistency between the Law on Property, as to what may be owned, and
the Law on Privatization, as to what may be privatized, should be
noted.2 4 Not surprisingly, the list of objects that may be owned is
somewhat broader than the list of property that may be privatized.
For instance, land is not among the items of privatizable property in
Article 1 of the Law on Privatization. 2
C.

The PrivatizationLaws

The Law on Privatization does not attempt to answer the question
of "who owns what." It more directly addresses the question of "who
knows what" and sets out a framework of federal, republic, and local
property funds that are to act as official sellers of privatizeable assets
once ownership and the right to sell have been determined. The Law
on Privatization clearly vests authority in the GKI as the entity that
"knows what" may be privatized and knows how privatization should
be conducted. The Law additionally empowers republic and local administrations to adopt their own privatization plans26 and authorizes
corresponding republic and local management committees to carry
out such programs.27
The responsibilities of the GKI specifically include the preparation
of "proposals on delineation of State property and division thereof
into property of the RSFSR, the republics comprising the RSFSR,
ERATION, SMALL-SCALE PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA:

THE NIZHNY NOVGOROD MODEL,

ANNEXES 1-12 (International Finance Corp. 1992).
24. Compare Vedomosti RSFSR [Law on the Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises in the RSFSR] art. 1 (July 3, 1991), reprintedin THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION, SMALL-SCALE PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA: THE NIZHNY NOVGOROD MODEL,

ANNEXES 1-12 (International Finance Corp. 1992) (defining scope of Law on Privatization)
with Vedomosti RSFSR [Law on Property in the RSFSR] art. 10 (Dec. 24, 1990), reprintedin
THE PARKER SCHOOL OF FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE LAW, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, RUSSIA AND THE REPUBLICS-LEGAL MATERIALS (John N. Hazard & Vratislav Pechota eds.,

1992) (listing objects which may be owned by citizens).
25. Vedomosti RSFSR [Law on the Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises in
the RSFSR] art. 1 (July 3, 1991), reprinted in THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, SMALL-SCALE PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA: THE NIZHNY NOVGOROD MODEL, ANNEXES 1-12 (International Finance Corp. 1992)

26. Vedomosti RSFSR [Law on the Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises in
the RSFSR] art. 3, § 5 (July 3, 1991), reprinted in THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, SMALL-SCALE PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA:
ANNEXES 1-12 (International Finance Corp. 1992).

THE NIZHNY NOVGOROD MODEL,

27. Id. art. 5.
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krais, oblasts, autonomous oblasts, autonomous areas, and municipal
property of districts, cities and other administrative and territorial entities, making part thereof."2 8 Once the GKI has determined ownership, the determination itself must be ratified by the legislative body
with jurisdiction over the property in question.2 9 For example, were
the GKI to determine that a specific asset belonged to a city, the relevant city council would have to ratify its ownership and a certificate
would be issued to document the allocation. Decisions of the GKI
are statutorily mandatory.30
The next federal step toward privatization occurred on December
27, 1991, when the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR adopted a resolution concerning "the Division of State Property in the RSFSR into
Federal Property and Property of the Republics of the RSFSR, Territories and Regions, an Autonomous Region, Autonomous Areas, the
31
Cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg, and of Municipal Property."
The short State Property Division Resolution incorporates three
addenda.

The first addendum describes federal property that belongs exclusively to Russia.32 Addendum 2 lists federal property that may be
transferred to a political subdivision of the federal state.33 Property
28. Id. art. 4, § 3.
29. Id.
30. Vedomosti RSFSR [Law on the Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises in
the RSFSR] art. 4, § 4 (July 3, 1991), reprinted in THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, SMALL-SCALE PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA:

THE NIZHNY NOVGOROD MODEL,

ANNEXES 1-12 (International Finance Corp. 1992). Amendments to the Law on Privatization
made in June 1992, have softened the approach to the GKI's authority by adding that only
decisions within the limits of the GKI's authority are mandatory. Also, amendments providing for adjudication of disputes with the GKI by means of courts and arbitration open the door
to the existence of such disputes.
31. Vedomosti RSFSR [Resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR Concerning the
Division of Property in the RSFSR] (Dec. 27, 1991), reprintedin THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
RUSSIAN

FEDERATION,

SMALL-SCALE

PRIVATIZATION

IN

RUSSIA:

THE

NIZHNY

NOVGOROD MODEL, ANNEXES 88-92 (International Finance Corp. 1992).
32. Id. art. 1 & addendum 1. Such exclusive federal property includes certain natural
resources and preserves of natural, historic or cultural importance, certain government property, defense-related property, and property involved in certain critical national industries,
such as transportation, energy, and communications. Pharmaceuticals and the production of
spirits and liquor are also categorized as industries whose property belongs exclusively to the
federal government. Id. addendum 1.
33. Id. art. 1 & addendum 2. Such property includes large industries not described in
Addendum 1, nuclear engineering facilities, health care facilities, research facilities, certain
schools, enterprises in the building industry, and automobile manufacturing facilities. Id. addendum 2.
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set forth in Addendum 3 is allocated specifically to the jurisdiction 3of4
the cities themselves, unless a city is affiliated with a larger district.

Property of Addendum 3 includes, most significantly, retail shops,
food facilities, and consumer services. 3' These enterprises are the subject of the small-scale privatizations implemented in Nizhny
Novgorod.
The attempts to establish possibilities for property ownership, to
determine jurisdiction over property, and to liberalize the laws with
respect to entrepreneurial activity,36 enable the Russian government
to accomplish its privatization program.37 At the most simple level,
privatization requires sellers and buyers. The government privatization program focuses chiefly on the sellers. It determines the nature
of the property that may be privatized and the rules of sale applicable
to the seller. Privatization documentation focuses on the rights and
obligations of the buyer.
The Law on Privatization, the Fundamental Provisions, 3 and the
State Program of Privatization 39 establish the legislative framework
34. Id. art. 2 & addendum 3.
35. Vedomosti RSFSR [Resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR Concerning the
Division of Property in the RSFSR] addendum 3, art. 2 (Dec. 27, 1991), reprinted in THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, SMALL-SCALE PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA:

THE NIZHNY NOVGOROD MODEL, ANNEXES 88-92 (International Finance Corp. 1992).
36. The Law on Enterprises and Entrepreneurial Activity of December 25, 1990 (the Law
on Enterprises) was enacted in conjunction with the Law on Property in the RSFSR to prepare
the legal basis for privatization. Vedomosti RSFSR [Law on Enterprises and Entrepreneurial
Activity] art. 5, § 1 (Dec. 25, 1990), reprinted in THE PARKER SCHOOL OF FOREIGN AND
COMPARATIVE

LAW, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY,

RUSSIA

AND

THE REPUBLICS-LEGAL

MATERIALS (John N. Hazard & Vratislav Pechota eds., 1992). The Law on Enterprises established the unequivocal right to open and run a private business. See id. art. 16 (defining rights
of entrepreneur). It incorporated concepts familiar to legal systems outside the former Soviet
bloc such as limited liability (Article 18, Section 2), exposure to creditors (Article 24, Section
3), and bankruptcy (Articles 37 and 38). See id. art. 18, § 2, art. 24, § 3, arts. 37, 38.
37. As stated above, the privatization program has consistently been viewed by President
Yeltsin and his economic team as being the point of no return in the process of democratization. See Carroll Bogert, Boris' Bet: Russian Roulette?, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 11, 1991, at 38
(quoting Yeltsin as defining his economic proposals as "the most important decision of my
life .. . ").
38. Fundamental Provisions Concerning the Program of Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises in the Russian Federation in 1992 (Dec. 29, 1991), reprintedin THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, SMALL-SCALE PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA: THE

NIZHNY NOVGOROD MODEL, ANNEXES 13-22 (International Finance Corp. 1992)
39. State Program of Privatization of State and Municipality Owned Enterprises of the

Russian Federation for 1992 (June 11, 1992), reprinted in THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, SMALL-SCALE PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA:
MODEL, ANNEXES 23-49 (International Finance Corp. 1992).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol24/iss2/8

THE NIZHNY NOVGOROD

10

Schneider: Property and Small-Scale Privitization in Russia.

1993]

PROPERTY AND SMALL-SCALE PRIVATIZATION

517

and governmental priorities applicable to privatization. Unfortunately, the legislation applicable to privatization contain no reference
to the property laws discussed above. Although not necessarily a fatal
flaw, such an absence certainly implies that the privatization legislation and the property laws were not overtly deemed to be in pari
materia by the Russian Parliament.

It is not necessary for purposes of this article to develop at length
the priorities applicable to the state property and assets to be privatized. 40 However, the privatization program itself is intended to ad-

40. The Fundamental Provisions and the State Program divide state property into four
categories: (1) property to be privatized in 1992; (2) property that may not be privatized in
1992; (3) property whose privatization requires authorization of the Russian government or of
one of the local government administrations, depending on ownership; (4) property that may
be privatized upon the decision of the GKI, taking into account the opinion of the relevant
sectoral ministry; and (5) property subject to local privatization programs. State Program of
Privatization of State and Municipality Owned Enterprises of the Russian Federation for 1992
art. 2, §§ 2.1.1 to 2.5.9 (June 11, 1992), reprinted in THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION, SMALL-SCALE PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA: THE NIZHNY NOVGOROD MODEL,

ANNEXES 23-49 (International Finance Corp. 1992); Fundamental Provisions Concerning the
Program of Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises in the Russian Federation in 1992
art. 1 (Dec. 29, 1991), reprinted in THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION,
SMALL-SCALE PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA: THE NIZHNY NOVGOROD MODEL, ANNEXES 13-

22 (International Finance Corp. 1992). The first category includes enterprises involved in
wholesale and retail, enterprises involved in aspects of agriculture and food processing, and
enterprises that are losing money or that have major uncompleted and overdue projects. Id.
art. 2, §§ 2.5.1 to 2.5.9. Foreign investment is, for obvious reasons, particularly encouraged in
the latter two areas. The category of property that may not be privatized in 1992 includes,
among other things, natural resources, historical and cultural properties, television and radio,
certain defense-related industries, and infrastructure industries, such as ports, electricity, roads
and pipelines. Id. art. 2, §§ 2.1.1 to 2.1.24; Fundamental Provisions Concerning the Program
of Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises in the Russian Federation in 1992 art. 2,
§ 1 (Dec. 29, 1991), reprintedin THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, SMALLSCALE PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA: THE NIZHNY NOVGOROD MODEL, ANNEXES 13-22 (In-

ternational Finance Corp. 1992). Parts of the nuclear industry, commercial banks, communications, printing, and industries involved in the extraction of raw materials make up the
category of property requiring explicit authorization to privatization. State Program of Privatization of State- and Municipality-Owned Enterprises of the Russian Federation for 1992 art.
2, §§ 2.2.1 to 2.2.15 (June 11, 1992), reprinted in THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, SMALL-SCALE PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA:

THE NIZHNY NOVGOROD MODEL,

ANNEXES 23-49 (International Finance Corp. 1992); Fundamental Provisions Concerning the
Program of Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises in the Russian Federation in 1992
art. 2, § 2 (Dec. 29, 1991), reprintedin THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION,
SMALL-SCALE PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA: THE NIZHNY NOVGOROD MODEL, ANNEXES 13-

22 (International Finance Corp. 1992). The fourth category of property is comprised of large
industries generally (if not treated elsewhere), industries producing tobacco, alcohol, liquor
and wine products, educational facilities, and medical equipment facilities and producers.
State Program of Privatization of State- and Municipality- Owned Enterprises of the Russian
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dress a transitional period in Russian economic and social history. As
such, the complex framework of laws, regulations, and instructions on
which the framework is based is a transient stage in Russian legal
reform. Once privatization has been completed, the need for the
privatization framework will have passed. At that point, the property
laws, and particularly the Law on Property, will be exclusively applicable to the network of new property relations created by
privatization.
D. The Land Decrees
The failure to permit large-scale land privatization has been viewed
by many economists and business people as a critical shortcoming of
the Yeltsin reforms.4 1 Currently, the Russian government does not
contemplate that significant state land will be privatized, although individuals are permitted to own small plots and land on which a dacha
or other small residence could be built. Nonetheless, in order to address the problem of land ownership in the privatization process,
President Yeltsin signed two decrees in 1992 to authorize citizens and
legal entities to own land associated with privatized assets or to enlarge a business commenced with privatized assets.42
Federation for 1992 art. 2, §§ 2.3.1 to 2.3.13 (June 11, 1992), reprintedin THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, SMALL-SCALE PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA:

THE NIZHNY

NOVGOROD MODEL, ANNEXES 23-49 (International Finance Corp. 1992); Fundamental Provisions Concerning the Program of Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises in the
Russian Federation in 1992 art. 2, § 2 (Dec. 29, 1991), reprinted in THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, SMALL-SCALE PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA: THE NIZHNY
NOVGOROD MODEL, ANNEXES 13-22 (International Finance Corp. 1992). Finally, local administrations have jurisdiction over certain public transport, waste-processing plants, and
other services. State Program of Privatization of State and Municipality Owned Enterprises of
the Russian Federation for 1992 art. 2, §§ 2.4.1 to 2.4.6 (June 11, 1992), reprinted in THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN

FEDERATION, SMALL-SCALE PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA:

THE NIZHNY NOVGOROD MODEL, ANNEXES 23-49 (International Finance Corp. 1992); Fundamental Provisions Concerning the Program of Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises in the Russian Federation in 1992 art. 2, § 3 (Dec. 29, 1991), reprinted in THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN

FEDERATION, SMALL-SCALE PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA:

THE NIZHNY NOVGOROD MODEL, ANNEXES 13-22 (International Finance Corp. 1992).

41. See Marshall I. Goldman, Yeltsin's Reforms: Gorbachev 11?, 88 FOREIGN POL'Y 76,
83 (1992) (noting delay in Yeltsin's agricultural reforms). This has left the possibility for
private ownership of land unclear. Id. Similarly, Yeltsin is criticized for his failure to break
other large monopolies. Id. at 78.
42. Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, No. 301 [On the Sale of Plots of
Land to Citizens and Juridicial Persons as Part of the Privatization of State and Municipal
Enterprises] (Mar. 25, 1992) (on file with St. Mary's Law Journal); Decree of the President of
the Russian Federation, No. 631 [On Confirming Procedure for the Sale of Tracts of Land
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The Land Decrees authorize foreigners involved in the purchase of

privatized assets or enterprises to acquire the appurtenant land. 3 The
right to acquire the appurtenant land must be guaranteed to a potential buyer in a privatization." Additional land tracts for purposes of
expansion of a privatized enterprise may be acquired through "tender
or auction of land unencumbered by rights of users or lessees." 4 5
Although the Land Decrees fall short of a complete liberalization of
an internal real estate market, they do mark a significant departure
from the socialist concept of state-owned land and a movement toward nearly unlimited private ownership in connection with a

privatization.'
III.

LOCAL REFORMS

A.

Federal Enabling Legislation
The decision at the federal level to initiate a wide-reaching privatization program created the need for local implementation. The Law
on Privatization, the Fundamental Provisions, and the State Program
acknowledge implicitly and authorize explicitly the undertaking of
During Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises and the Expansion of and Additional
Construction to these Enterprises, and Also Offered to Citizens and Associations of Citizens
for Entrepreneurial Activity] (June 14, 1992), reprintedin Decree OutlinesLegal Proceduresfor
Buying Commercial Land During Privatization, RUSSIA AND COMMONWEALTH BUSINESS
LAW REPORT, Aug. 10, 1992, at 3-4, 7-9 (on file with St. Mary's Law Journal). These provisions are collectively referred to as the Land Decrees.
43. Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, No. 631 [On Confirming Procedure for the Sale of Tracts of Land During Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises
and the Expansion of and Additional Construction to these Enterprises, and Also Offered to
Citizens and Associations of Citizens for Entrepreneurial Activity] § 3 (June 14, 1992), reprinted in Decree OutlinesLegal Proceduresfor Buying Commercial Land During Privatization,
RUSSIA AND COMMONWEALTH BUSINESS LAW REPORT, Aug. 10, 1992, at 3-4, 7-9 (on file
with St. Mary's Law Journal).
44. Id. § 6.
45. Id. § 12.
46. It should be noted that Section 2 of the Procedures Covering Land Sales states that
"[c]ompulsory redemption of title to tracts of land sold in accordance with this Procedure is
done in an amount at least as high as the cost paid by the purchaser for the tract of land." Id.
§ 2. This unassuming sentence would seem to indicate that the Russian Government retains
the unrestricted right to reclaim any land it sells so long as it reimburses (in undoubtedly
devalued rubles) the amount paid by the former owner to acquire the land. President Yeltsin
issued a new decree in October 1992 concerning land. Russia has embarked on a voucher
system of privatization for private citizens. The decree was issued in connection with the
voucher issuance to accelerate privatization. It basically permits holders of vouchers issued by
the Government to exchange the vouchers for land and housing, as well as for interests in
assets or enterprises being privatized.
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privatization programs on the purely local level. Local privatization
programs are required to be consistent with the general federal privatization framework. They must be elaborated by the local state property committee and approved by the local Council of People's
Deputies (or city council, as the case may be). 47 Such programs may
be approved for periods no longer than one year.4 8 Local state property committees are expected to work closely with the GKI to ensure
that no inconsistency develops between the permissions and restrictions on the local level and those on the federal level. Nonetheless,
nothing in the Law on Privatization requires a uniform approach to
the actual process of transferring property from state to private
hands.
In Article 2, Section 2.4, the State Program provides partial answers to the questions: "Who owns what?" and "Who has jurisdiction to sell what property?" Article 2, Section 2.4 lists certain assets
and enterprises that must be privatized on the local level. 49 The State
Property Division Resolution provides the rest of the answers for the
local state property committees. Addendum 3 to that resolution allocates specific property to local administration. The targets of the
Nizhny Novgorod privatization experiment described below are specifically listed in Addendum 3: "retail shops, catering facilities and
' 50
consumer services."
The Russian government has made basic distinctions among large-,
medium-, and small-scale privatizations. Different economic considerations and varying social factors are involved in each. The Russian
government understands that it is much more difficult, both practically and morally, to ignore the demands of a large workforce to pre-

47. State Program of Privatization of State and Municipality Owned Enterprises of the
Russian Federation for 1992 art. 11, § 11.1 (June 11, 1992), reprinted in THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE RUSSIAN

FEDERATION,

SMALL-SCALE PRIVATIZATION

IN RUSSIA:

THE NIZHNY

NOVGOROD MODEL, ANNEXES 23-49 (International Finance Corp. 1992)
48. Id. art. 11, § 11.3.
49. Id. art. 2, § 2.4.1 to 2.4.6. The list includes mass transit facilities, bath houses and
laundries, funeral parlors, waste treatment plants, pharmacies and social, cultural and entertainment facilities. Id.
50. Vedomosti RSFSR [Resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR Concerning the
Division of Property in the RSFSR] addendum 3 (Dec. 27, 1991), reprintedin THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, SMALL-SCALE PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA: THE
NIZHNY NOVGOROD MODEL, ANNEXES 88-92 (International Finance Corp. 1992). Adden-

dum 3 also lists certain residential and non-residential building stock, certain construction and
engineering enterprises, warehouse facilities and certain health care establishments. Id.
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serve for them an equity stake in the privatization process.
Consequently, large-scale privatizations involving enterprises with a
workforce of over 1,000 or a book value of fixed capital in excess of 50
million rubles as of January 1, 1992, must be privatized by first being
transformed from state enterprises to joint stock companies. 5 Such

pre-privatization positioning allows the government and the GKI to
earmark a portion of the shares for the workforce.5 2 On the other
hand, small-scale enterprises are to be sold at auction or through a

tender process. 53 While not ensuring any role for the employees, auctions and tenders promise faster results. As a practical matter, then,
many employees would in all likelihood by rehired by the new owner
or owners.

Notwithstanding a flurry of activity among large state enterprises,
their workers, and their managers, the Russian state has seen very few

large-scale privatizations. 54 Instead, small-scale privatizations have
occurred with far greater frequency on the local level. Consequently,
and because a discussion of large-scale privatizations would require a
separate article, the focus of this discussion is on a description of the
small-scale privatizations occurring in Nizhny Novgorod pursuant to
the Law on Privatization and the division of property in the State

Property Division Resolution.
B.

The Nizhny Novgorod Program

The Nizhny Novgorod experiment in privatization, with the assistance of the International Finance Corporation, represents the most
51. State Program of Privatization of State and Municipality Owned Enterprises of the
Russian Federation for 1992 art. 5, § 5.2 (June 11, 1992), reprintedin THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, SMALL-SCALE PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA: THE NIZHNY
NOVGOROD MODEL, ANNEXES 23-49 (International Finance Corp. 1992). See generally Decree of the President of the Russian Federaiton, No. 721 [Provisions on the Commercialization
of State Enterprises to be Concurrently Transformed into Open-End Joint Stock Companies]
(July 1, 1992) (on file with St. Mary's Law Journal) (commonly known as "Conversion
Decree").
52. Id. art. 5, § 5.4. Section 5.4 of the State Program sets out three options to provide for
shareholding by the workforce in a privatizing enterprise. Workers' collectives are entitled to
choose the package that suits their aims and means. Interestingly, the workforce is defined so
as to include, aside from actual employees, pensioners and former employees, subject to certain
restrictions, who were voluntarily discharged or discharged as a result of labor cutbacks. Id.
53. Id. art. 5, § 5.2.
54. Most of the activity so far has involved wrangling over control issues and questions
regarding the eventual participation of labor and management in the capital of such
enterprises.
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far-reaching privatization program to date in Russia." Nizhny
Novgorod benefits from a large pool of small-scale enterprises as well

as from the reformist bent of its mayor, Dmitri Ivanovich Bednyakov,

and the oblast governor, Boris Nemtsov.
The Nizhny Novgorod program began in November 1991 when the
City Council adopted two resolutions creating a city property fund

and providing the broad outlines of the privatization program.5 6 The
purpose of the local legislation in the area of privatization was to ensure a stable regime for the transfer of ownership from the state to
private investors. The legislation was also needed to provide some
mechanism for the resolution of disputes that would inevitably arise
when the ownership of the property was transferred from one group
to another. The Nizhny Novgorod resolutions were expressly

adopted on the basis of the Law on Privatization and the Law on

Property. 57 The mayor of Nizhny Novgorod issued additional resolu-

tions on March 6 and March 30, 1992. These resolutions addressed
the specific legal framework for auctioning retail shops, catering facil-

ities, and consumer services.5" The City Council of Nizhny Novgorod

55. The program discussed in this article focuses on small-scale enterprises and not the
major defense-related industries located in Nizhny Novgorod. The larger industries present
special problems and the systematic privatization of such industries has not yet occurred. Policy justifications for beginning with the small-scale privatizations in Nizhny Novgorod include
the relative lack of complexity of such transactions and the need to give more Russians a direct
stake in the functioning of the economy. Also, medium- and large-scale privatizations often
require foreign capital and therefore require more time and expertise to structure.
56. Nizhny Novgorod City Council, Res. No. 7/8 [Concerning the Property Fund of
Nizhny Novgorod] (Nov. 14, 1991), reprintedin THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, SMALL-SCALE PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA:

THE NIZHNY NOVGOROD MODEL,

ANNEXES 111-14 (International Finance Corp. 1992); Nizhny Novgorod City Council, Res.
No. 7/9 [Concerning the Program of Urgent Measures for the Privatization of Municipal
Property of the City of Nizhny Novgorod] (Nov. 14, 1991), reprinted in THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, SMALL-SCALE PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA: THE NIZHNY
NOVGOROD MODEL, ANNEXES 115-20 (International Finance Corp. 1992).
57. Nizhny Novgorod City Council, Res. No. 7/8 [Concerning the Property Fund of
Nizhny Novgorod] pmbl. (Nov. 14, 1991), reprinted in THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION, SMALL-SCALE PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA: THE NIZHNY NOVGOROD MODEL,
ANNEXES 111-14 (International Finance Corp. 1992); Nizhny Novgorod City Council, Res.
No. 7/9 [Concerning the Program of Urgent Measures for the Privatization of Municipal
Property of the City of Nizhny Novgorod] § 2 (Nov. 14, 1991), reprinted in THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, SMALL-SCALE PRIVATIZATION

IN RUSSIA:

THE

NIZHNY NOVGOROD MODEL, ANNEXES 115-20 (International Finance Corp. 1992).

58. Both the March 6 and the March 30 Resolutions approved and had annexed to them
detailed regulations on the privatization of retail shops, catering facilities and consumer services in Nizhny Novgorod. The March 30 Regulations, however, were drafted on the basis not

only of the regulations promulgated on March 6 but in light of the first experiences with the
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then acted by resolution on April 22, 1992, to ratify and adopt a final
set of regulations concerning the privatization procedures relevant to
the sale of these properties.5 9
The Nizhny Novgorod administration decided to apply an assetbased approach to small-scale privatizations. That is, rather than
privatizing an ongoing enterprise, the city first liquidated the enterprise and then sold only the assets of the enterprise. 6" The Nizhny
Novgorod administration reasoned, undoubtedly correctly, that potential investors would not be interested in obtaining an ongoing and
perhaps heavily indebted enterprise. This asset-based approach to
privatization caused an unavoidable dislocation among the workforce
in Nizhny Novgorod. 6 1 For that reason, other cities looking to establish a privatization regime have not generally followed the Nizhny
Novgorod model. Because other cities have not progressed so far as
Nizhny Novgorod in a privatization program, however, it is not yet
possible to know whether they will attain superior results in attracting
investors to the local economy.

auctions themselves. Consequently, the regulations attached to the March 30 Resolution were
adopted to replace in their entirety the regulations promulgated on March 6. Head of Administration of the City of Nizhny Novgorod, Res. No. 15 (Concerning the Privatization of Retail
Shops, Catering Facilities, and Consumer Services in Nizhny Novgorod in 1992] (Mar. 6,
1992), reprintedin THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, SMALL-SCALE PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA: THE NIZHNY NOVGOROD MODEL, ANNEXES 95-97 (International Finance Corp. 1992); Head of Administration of the City of Nizhny Novgorod, Res. No. 27
[Concerning Amendments and Additions to the Resolution of the Head of Administration of
the City of Nizhny Novgorod of March 6, 1992, No. 15] (Mar. 30, 1992), reprinted in THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, SMALL-SCALE PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA:

THE NIZHNY NOVGOROD MODEL, ANNEXES 98-102 (International Finance Corp. 1992).
59. The April 22 Resolution, building on the experience of additional auctions and the
privatization procedures promulgated with the March 30 Resolution, promulgated a further
set of similar regulations to regularize and ratify the actions Mayor Bednyakov had taken on
his own. Presidium of the Nizhny Novgorod City Council, Res. No. 53 [Concerning the
Privatization of Retail Shops, Catering Facilities, and Consumer Services in Nizhny Novgorod
in 1992] (Apr. 22, 1992), reprinted in THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION,
SMALL-SCALE PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA: THE NIZHNY NOVGOROD MODEL, ANNEXES

104-10 (International Finance Corp. 1992).
60. Id. § 1.3. Section 1.3 of the April 22 Resolution reads "[t]he objects of privatization
are the assets of liquidated municipal enterprises and their structural subdivisions of all types
of trade, public catering and consumer services for the population. Municipal enterprises...
are liquidated in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation and these regulations." Id.
61. Mayor Bednyakov reported a resulting unemployment rate of approximately 4%. Interview with Dmitri Ivanovich Bednyakov, Mayor of the City of Nizhny Novgorod, in Charlotte, N.C. (Oct. 15, 1992).
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The City Fund Resolution and the April 22 Resolution brought to
the private investor the privatization regime that had begun at the
federal level. Local state property management committees (a local
GKI), which functioned primarily as agency decision-making bodies
and as sources of information regarding privatizable assets and state
property funds, had been authorized under the Law on Privatization.6 2 Under the asset-based approach adopted by Nizhny
Novgorod, the local GKI, the City Council, and the City Fund for
Nizhny Novgorod collected information about a privatizable enterprise and issued a "registration certificate" or "privatization passport" for each such enterprise.6 3 Upon issuance of a privatization
passport, the relevant enterprise was placed in a liquidation proceeding pending privatization. The local GKI, upon compliance with the
liquidation provisions of the April 22 Resolution,"' acted as "the legal
successor" of the liquidated enterprise.65
Once the local GKI was in possession of the liquidated enterprise,
the assets of the enterprise had to be transferred to the local property
fund for privatization. To that end, the City Fund Resolution, consistent with Article 7, Section 1 of the Law on Privatization, established
the City Fund for Nizhny Novgorod and authorized it to "temporar-

62. Vedomosti RSFSR [Law on the Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises in
the RSFSR] arts. 5,7 (July 3, 1991), reprintedin THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, SMALL-SCALE PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA: THE NIZHNY NOVGOROD MODEL, AN-

NEXES 2-12 (International Finance Corp. 1992).
63. Presidium of the Nizhny Novgorod City Council, Res. No. 53 [Concerning the Privatization of Retail Shops, Catering Facilities, and Consumer Services in Nizhny Novgorod in
1992] art. 2, § 2.2 (Apr. 22, 1992), reprintedin THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, SMALL-SCALE PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA: THE NIZHNY NOVGOROD MODEL, AN-

NEXES 104-10 (International Finance Corp. 1992).
64. Id. art. 4. The April 22 Resolution provides that issuance of the privatization passport triggers a two-month period during which creditors of the enterprise are permitted to
make claims with the local GKI. Id. art. 4, § 4.1. Creditors' claims are to be paid out of the
proceeds of privatizations from a special account of the local GKI. Id. art. 4, § 4.7. At the
expiration of the two-month period, the employees of the enterprise are dismissed pending sale
of the assets at an auction. Id. art. 4, § 4.2. During this period the enterprise is managed by a
liquidation committee composed of a director of the enterprise, deputies of the City Council
and appointees named by the local GKI. Presidium of the Nizhny Novgorod City Council,
Res. No. 53 [Concerning the Privatization of Retail Shops, Catering Facilities, and Consumer
Services in Nizhny Novgorod in 1992] art. 4, § 4.3 (Apr. 22, 1992), reprinted in THE GovERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, SMALL-SCALE PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA: THE

NIZHNY NOVGOROD MODEL, ANNEXES 104-10 (International Finance Corp. 1992). If the
assets of the enterprise are for any reason not sold at the auction, the enterprise will be returned to normal operation. Id. art. 4, § 4.9.
65. Id. art. 2, § 2.4.
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ily own city property certificates transferred to it by the [local GKI]
for municipal enterprises, for shares in the capital of joint-stock companies, and for other city property."6 6 When the City Fund of
Nizhny Novgorod obtained the appropriate certificate, the privatizeable assets were properly positioned for sale to private investors, as
required by the Law on Privatization and by the April 22 Resolution.
IV.

SELLERS AND BUYERS

The purpose of this section is to continue to trace the devolution of
the ownership of the property from the state to private investors and
to describe the general nature of the new contractual relationships
needed to document the transfer of ownership. Accordingly, the details of the auction process itself will not be described in this article,
although there have been several regulations adopted by the GKI and
the local GKI dictating the conduct and mechanics of privatization
auctions.6 7
A.

ContractualRelationships

Citizens of Russia and legal entities formed under Russian law were
eligible buyers for purposes of Nizhny Novgorod's April 22 Resolution. 68 However, foreign citizens as well as foreign legal entities were
excluded from the Nizhny Novgorod auctions. In Russia, a legal entity is considered "foreign" for these purposes if more than twentyfive percent of its capital is held by non-Russians. 69 Although the
policy of the Russian government and of the GKI is to encourage
foreign participation in privatizations, the small-scale nature of the
Nizhny Novgorod privatizations made the participation of foreigners
less crucial and, from the Russian point of view, less desirable. The
assets and new enterprises emerging from the Nizhny Novgorod auc66. Nizhny Novgorod City Council, Res. No. 7/8 [Concerning the Property Fund of
Nizhny Novgorod] art. 7, § 1 (Nov. 14, 1991), reprinted in THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RusSIAN FEDERATION, SMALL-SCALE PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA:
MODEL, ANNEXES 111-14 (International Finance Corp. 1992)

THE NIZHNY NOVGOROD

67. Such regulations include various GKI provisional regulations on auctions, conditional auctions, economic incentives and privatization committees.
68. Presidium of the Nizhny Novgorod City Council, Res. No. 53 [Concerning the Privatization of Retail Shops, Catering Facilities, and Consumer Services in Nizhny Novgorod in
1992] art. 3, § 3.2 (Apr. 22, 1992), reprintedin THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, SMALL-SCALE PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA: THE NIZHNY NOVGOROD MODEL, ANNEXES 104-10 (International Finance Corp. 1992).

69. Id. art. 3, § 3.3.
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tions were meant to provide a significant basis for local initiative and
employment.
Article 27, Section 1 of the Law on Privatization provides that appropriate agreements must be entered into between the seller and the
buyer in a privatization transaction. After specifying the minimum
terms to be included in such an agreement,7 ° the Law on Privatization
declares that "the right of property to an enterprise shall pass from
the seller to the buyer from the time of registration of an agreement in
accordance with the procedure determined by the legislation of the
RSFSR. ' ' 71 Prior to its amendment in June 1992, the article went on
to state that the agreement in question may provide otherwise. This
additional language presumably meant that the parties may negotiate
the exact timing of the transfer of title. This language could have
created some uncertainty, however, if considerations other than the
date and time of registration were used. 72 Now, after amendment, the
Law on Privatization no longer states that the agreement may provide
otherwise with respect to the transfer of title. Instead, the law states
that a registered agreement is documentary proof of the buyer's right
to ownership. This language now agrees with Article 28, Section 3 of
the Law on Privatization which states that "[l]egal rights of the buyers and sellers ... shall terminate and arise from the date of registra-

70. Vedomosti RSFSR [Law on the Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises in
the RSFSR] art. 27, § 2 (July 3, 1991), reprinted in THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION, SMALL-SCALE PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA: THE NIZHNY NOVGOROD MODEL,

ANNEXES 2-12 (International Finance Corp. 1992).
71. Id. art. 27, § 3.
72. Articles 8, Sections 8.1 and 8.2 of the April 22 Resolution require registration of the
privatization agreements but do not provide any detail about where or when such registration
is to occur. Presidium of the Nizhny Novgorod City Council, Res. No. 53 [Concerning the
Privatization of Retail Shops, Catering Facilities, and Consumer Services in Nizhny Novgorod
in 1992] art. 8, §§ 8.1, 8.2 (Apr. 22, 1992), reprinted in THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION, SMALL-SCALE PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA: THE NIZHNY NOVGOROD MODEL,

ANNEXES 104-10 (International Finance Corp. 1992). Article 7, Section 7.4 of the April 22
Resolution somewhat contradicts the idea that title passes upon registration of the agreement.
Id. art. 7, § 7.4. It provides that the right of property accrues from the moment of payment in
full of the purchase price. Id. Article 7, Section 7.5 provides that, in the case of installment
payments, the right of property accrues upon payment of 30% of the purchase price. Id. art.
7, § 7.5. Transfer of title upon making such payments is supported by language in the Contract of Purchase and Sale, discussed below. Contract of Purchase and Sale of Right of Ownership of Non-Residential Municipal Property, Including Equipment and Inventory, reprinted
in THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, SMALL-SCALE PRIVATIZATION IN
RUSSIA: THE NIZHNY NOVGOROD MODEL, ANNEXES 140-42 (International Finance Corp.
1992).
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tion of the agreement between them."
The contractual framework put in place in Nizhny Novgorod required the buyer to sign at least four instruments or agreements to
document the transfer of ownership of the privatized assets: a Record
of Purchase, a Contract of Purchase and Sale, an Act of Transfer and
Acceptance, and a Certificate of Ownership. Although not expressly
required, presumably all four of these documents had to be appropriately registered and the full amount of the purchase price, or at least
30%, had to be paid for title in the property to pass to the buyer.
Execution of the Record of Purchase and the Contract for Purchase
and Sale were required by Paragraph 9 of Addendum 1 to Nizhny
Novgorod's April 22 Resolution. The Record of Purchase, a document executed immediately upon termination of the auction, attested
merely to the particulars of the auction, such as identification of the
assets purchased, the opening price and purchase price, the date and
location of the auction, and the identity of the auctioneer.
In the Nizhny Novgorod auctions, the Contract of Purchase and
Sale was signed by the seller and the buyer. This document incorporated an annex setting forth the legal description of the purchased
property.74 The seller was required to transfer the property to the
buyer by signing the Act of Transfer and Acceptance within a specified number of days after signing the contract. 75 The risk of loss
passed to the buyer upon the execution of the Act of Transfer and
Acceptance. 76 Additionally, upon paying the purchase price, the

73. Vedomosti RSFSR [Law on the Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises in
the RSFSR] art. 28, § 3 (July 3, 1991), reprinted in THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION, SMALL-SCALE PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA: THE NIZHNY NOVGOROD MODEL,

ANNEXES 2-12 (International Finance Corp. 1992).
74. This article looks only at the actual purchase of assets as opposed to the purchase of
the right to lease assets. The purchase of the right to lease assets is documented similarly and
carries with it the right to buy the assets outright during the term of the lease. Presidium of
the Nizhny Novgorod City Council, Res. No. 53 [Concerning the Privatization of Retail
Shops, Catering Facilities, and Consumer Services in Nizhny Novgorod in 1992] art. 7, §§ 7.7,
7.8 (Apr. 22, 1992), reprintedin THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, SMALLSCALE PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA: THE NIZHNY NOVGOROD MODEL, ANNEXES 104-10 (In-

ternational Finance Corp. 1992).
75. Contract of Purchase and Sale of Right of Ownership of Non-Residential Municipal
Property, Including Equipment and Inventory art. 2, § 2.1.1, reprinted in THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, SMALL-SCALE PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA:

THE NIZHNY

NOVGOROD MODEL, ANNEXES 140-42 (International Finance Corp. 1992).
76. Id. art. 2, § 2.1.3.
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seller was issued the Certificate of Ownership evidencing title."
The buyer in the Nizhny Novgorod auctions undertook a number
of significant obligations in the Contract of Purchase and Sale. Apart
from the expected payment obligations, the buyer (1) waived any
claims as to the condition of the assets being sold,7" (2) agreed not to
sell the assets for at least one year and, if selling the assets within five
years, to pay the City Fund a 30% fee on the amount realized over
the total of the auction price and the cost of documented repairs and
improvements, 79 and (3) agreed to use the premises where the assets
are located for five years "exclusively for purposes of retail trade,
communal services or as a shop." 0
The Act of Transfer and Acceptance had a somewhat different purpose from the other documentary requirements. According to Article
4, Section 4.6 of the April 22 Resolution, to liberate the assets being
privatized, the Act of Transfer and Acceptance had to be signed no
later than three days after the auction by the manager of the enterprise that had been liquidated.8 1 The buyer and the City of Nizhny
Novgorod were also required to execute the Act of Transfer and Acceptance, which then had to be approved by the City Fund and the
local GKI.82 As described in the Contract of Purchase and Sale, the
Act of Transfer and Acceptance documented the actual transfer of the
assets to the buyer as well as the transfer of the risk of loss. Title to
the assets was not acquired, however, until the buyer delivered the
Certificate of Ownership. The Certificate of Ownership indirectly evidences receipt of the required payment of the purchase price and actual transfer of title. It is a short document that cross-references the
relevant Contract of Purchase and Sale and enables the parties to refer to a fuller description of the assets themselves. One copy of the
77. Id. art. 2, § 2.1.2.
78. Id. art. 2, § 2.2.1.
79. Contract of Purchase and Sale of Right of Ownership of Non-Residential Municipal
Property, Including Equipment and Inventory art. 2, § 2.2.3, reprinted in THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE RUSSIAN

FEDERATION,

SMALL-SCALE PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA:

THE NIZHNY

NOVGOROD MODEL, ANNEXES 140-42 (International Finance Corp. 1992).

80. Id. art. 2, § 2.2.4.
81. Presidium of the Nizhny Novgorod City Council, Res. No. 53 [Concerning the Privatization of Retail Shops, Catering Facilities, and Consumer Services in Nizhny Novgorod in
1992] art. 4, § 4.6 (Apr. 22, 1992), reprinted in THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, SMALL-SCALE PRIVATIZATION

NEXES

IN RUSSIA:

THE NIZHNY NOVGOROD MODEL, AN-

104-10 (International Finance Corp. 1992).

82. Id.
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Certificate of Ownership must be maintained at the tax office. Once
the buyer obtained the Certificate of Ownership, the privatization process was complete.
Apart from any contractual rights the seller might have against the
buyer as a result of the Nizhny Novgorod auctions,13 specific justifications exist in the laws to declare one of the privatization transactions
invalid. For example, a transaction may be declared invalid if the
buyer was not qualified under the applicable laws and regulations; if
the rules of an auction were grossly violated or illegal preferences
were given to the buyer; if the transaction was not authorized by the
GKI; or if illegal means of payment were used to satisfy the purchase
84
price.
B. Dispute Resolution
An integral part of any new scheme of property relations must be
an equitable dispute resolution system to safeguard the rights of parties arising out of property. The weakness of the dispute resolution
system in Russian courts, arbitration proceedings, and commissions
blights the sure development and enforcement of new property relations. A description of the Russian dispute resolution system is well
beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, the specific mechanisms provided in the laws and regulations applicable to privatization
should be mentioned.
The Law on Privatization itself merely refers potential claimants in
an invalid privatization transaction to the courts and arbitration proceedings required or permitted by applicable legislation in Russia.85
Nizhny Novgorod's April 22 Resolution provided several specific
methods to resolve disputes created by the privatization effort. Two
policy goals support providing more specific dispute resolution mech83. Article 3 of the Contract of Purchase and Sale gives the seller certain rights in cases

when the buyer is not complying with the terms of the contract. Contract of Purchase and
Sale of Right of Ownership of Non-Residential Municipal Property, Including Equipment and
Inventory art. 3, reprinted in THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, SMALLSCALE PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA: THE NIZHNY NOVGOROD MODEL, ANNEXES 140-42 (International Finance Corp. 1992). These rights include the right to repossess the privatized

property. Id. art. 3, § 3.1.2.
84. Vedomosti RSFSR [Law on the Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises in
the RSFSR] art. 9, § 2, art. 30, § 1 (July 3, 1991), reprinted in THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
RUSSIAN

FEDERATION,

SMALL-SCALE

PRIVATIZATION

IN

RUSSIA:

THE

NIZHNY

NOVGOROD MODEL, ANNEXES 2-12 (International Finance Corp. 1992).
85. Id. art. 30, § 3.
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anisms in a privatization program. First, local commissions and
boards will be more knowledgeable than the courts about the privatization process itself. Additionally, the creation of special procedures may keep some disputes out of the inefficient court system but
will not sacrifice a binding determination.
The April 22 Resolution of Nizhny Novgorod provided at the most
practical level that any "arguments and disagreements" that occurred
during the auction itself were to be resolved fully and finally by the
auctioneer.8 6 It is doubtful that such a provision could have prevented someone from lodging a claim in court relating to an auction.
Still, the April 22 Resolution did attempt to deal with such "arguments and disagreements" as efficiently as possible.
Recognizing the likelihood of employee claims relating to the liquidation of enterprises whose assets were subject to privatization, the
City Council of Nizhny Novgorod established a special department
within the local GKI to deal with such claims.87 To address the
broader, more typical claims resulting from a privatization, the April
22 Resolution referred such claims to the joint deliberation of the Permanent Commission of the City Council on Economic Reform and
Development of Management and Self-Management, the local GKI,
and the City Fund of Nizhny Novgorod. as Again, it is doubtful that
such a provision operated to deprive a persistent claimant of the right
provided under the Law on Privatization to seek redress in Russian
courts or through arbitration. The provisions taken together, however, represented an attempt to develop greater efficiency in the resolution of property disputes.
The foregoing description of the transfer of property from the state
to private Russian investors applies, as regards the local particulars,
to the situation in Nizhny Novgorod. As noted above, local administrations were given certain flexibility to structure and document their
own programs under the Law on Privatization. 9 The Nizhny

86. Presidium of the Nizhny Novgorod City Council, Res. No. 53 [Concerning the Privatization of Retail Shops, Catering Facilities, and Consumer Services in Nizhny Novgorod in
1992] addendum 1, § 13 (Apr. 22, 1992), reprinted in THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION, SMALL-SCALE PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA:

THE NIZHNY NOVGOROD MODEL,

ANNEXES 104-10 (International Finance Corp. 1992).
87. Id. art. 2, § 2.5.
88. Id. art. 1, § 1.9.
89. State Program of Privatization of State and Municipality Owned Enterprises of the
Russian Federation for 1992 art. 11, §§ 11.1 to 11.7 (June 11, 1992), reprintedin THE Gov-
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Novgorod administration speedily elaborated a coherent privatization
program. However, the costs and benefits to society and the economy
of these specific reforms remain to be observed.
V.

OPEN ISSUES: THE "DEAD SOULS" PROBLEM

The "dead souls" problem presented by the current privatization
situation in Russia is two-fold. First, in the hopes that they will be
able to put the assets to productive use, the new property owners accept a clear economic risk by acquiring assets. Whether the newly
privatized assets are truly valuable or can be made valuable, or
whether they are "ambiguous capital," however, is the essence of the
market reform process. The component of economic risk entailed in
the transfer of property from the state to the private sector will, in the
view of President Yeltsin, make democracy a natural outgrowth of the
privatization process.
The second aspect of the "dead souls" problem is more problematic. Even Chichikov had convinced himself that he could put the
"impalpable sound" of his acquisitions to some productive use. Will
the system, and particularly the laws, permit him to use the property
in the manner in which he had intended? Will the legal system permit
activities traditionally associated with private property ownership in
western legal systems? Chichikov's specific aim to use the dead souls
as collateral for a loan from a government agency might, in fact, very
well be within the immediate purview of, for example, a buyer in one
of the Nizhny Novgorod auctions. A sore need for cash exists, and
using the privatized property as collateral for a loan from a bank or
some other credit agency may be an immediate necessity.
A.

Conflicting Claims to Property

Is the property regime implicitly assumed by the privatization
framework a legal reality in Russia? The Law on Privatization and
the programs and regulations that have been promulgated as a result
of it are temporary. When no more property remains to be privatized,

ERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, SMALL-SCALE PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA:

THE

NIZHNY NOVGOROD MODEL, ANNEXES 23-49 (International Finance Corp. 1992); Fundamental Provisions Concerning the Program of Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises in the Russian Federation in 1992 art. 12 (Dec. 29, 1991), reprinted in THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, SMALL-SCALE PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA:

THE NIZHNY NOVGOROD MODEL, ANNEXES 14-22 (International Finance Corp. 1992).
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the legal framework for privatization will "wither away" and owners
will have to look to other normative laws for their rights and protections. The Law on Property, the most important of these other laws,
is buttressed by the Civil Code of the RSFSR9 ° and must generally
conform to the overarching provisions of the Constitution.9 1
As with so much economic and commercial legislation in Russia,

the Law on Property, the Civil Code, and the Constitution have not
been brought into accord. The legal deficiencies inherent in such a
situation may not have been troubling when private ownership com-

posed an insignificant part of the economy. With efforts to reverse the
historical balance in the economy in full play, however, the inconsistencies in certain critical areas need to be defined.
The Constitution was adopted in April 1978 on the basis of the

newly amended, so-called Brezhnev Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In contradiction to what is allowed by the
Law on Property, it reserves all property ownership, with the exception of certain types of non-productive, personal property, to the
state. 92 Moreover, it flatly prohibits the productive use of personal

property.93 Such a reservation of state ownership was, of course, at

the very heart of the socialist system and one of the reasons that the
Bolsheviks quickly prohibited most private property ownership imme-

90. See GK RSFSR [Civil Code of the RSFSR] arts. 151-57 (1964), reprinted in THE
SOVIET CODES OF LAW 391-541 (William B. Simons ed., A.K.R. Kiralfy trans., 1980) (providing for protection of property rights).
91. See KONST. RSFSR [Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the RSFSR] arts. 37-67
(1978), reprinted in Union ofSoviet Socialist Republics, Supplement, The Russian Federation,in
19 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 3-40 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert
H. Flanz eds., 1991) (defining "Basic Rights, Freedoms, and Duties of Citizens of the
RSFSR"); see also Draft Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the RSFSR art. 36 (1991), reprinted in Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Supplement 3, The Russian Federation, in 19
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 3-77 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H.
Flanz eds., 1991) (proposing "inalienable" right to own property).
92. See Larisa Krasavchikova, Comments on the Law on Property in the Russian Soviet
Federated Socialist Republic, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 481, 483 (1992) (discussing expansion of
personal property rights under the Law on Property in the RSFSR in comparison to Constitution of the USSR).
93. KONST. RSFSR [Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the RSFSR] art. 13 (1978), reprinted in Union ofSoviet Socialist Republics, Supplement, The Russian Federation, in 19 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 3-40 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H.
Flanz eds., 1991). Article 13 of the Constitution states, "[p]roperty owned or used by citizens
shall not serve as a means of deriving unearned income or be employed to the detriment of the
interests of society." Id.
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diately after the 1917 Revolution.
Several groups have been formulating a draft of a new constitution
for Russia, but nothing has been adopted. 9 Notwithstanding the intent to draft a new constitution, the Constitution of 1978 still has the
force of law in Russia since it has never been annulled or suspended.
Indeed it was amended extensively in April 1992.96 The constitu-

tional prohibition on the productive use of property translates into a
criminalization of the same activity under the Criminal Code of the
RSFSR. 97 Additionally, the Civil Code provides that any property
used in such a manner may be taken from the owner without compensation. 98 These glaring inconsistencies in the legislation applicable to
property are not overcome by any language in the Law on Privatization or in the Law on Enterprises.99
94. W. E. BUTLER, SOVIET LAW 174-75 (1983).

95. See Declaration of the State Sovereignty of the RSFSR § 15 (Jul. 12, 1990), reprinted
in Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Supplement, The Russian Federation, in 19 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 45-47 (Albert p. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz

eds., 1991) (recognizing basis for elaboration of new RSFSR Constitution); see also Draft Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the RSFSR art. 36 (1991), reprinted in Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Supplement 3, The Russian Federation, in 19 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 3-77 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1991) (propos-

ing "inalienable" right to own property).
96. Although some might argue that the Constitution has no force in Russia, the Constitutional Court, which has already ruled on several cases and is deliberating on others, is relying on it. In fact, the act creating the Constitutional Court began with the assertion that "the
supremacy of the RSFSR Constitution and its direct operation throughout the territory of the
RSFSR shall be an integral element of the democratic rule-of-law state of the Russian Federation. Constitutional control shall be exercised to guarantee conformity of the provisions of
legislation and the practice of their application with the Fundamental Law [the Constitution]
of the RSFSR ...... Vedomosti RSFSR [Decree of the RSFSR Congress of the People's Deputies Enacting the RSFSR Constitutional Court Act] pmbl. (July 12, 1992) (on file with St.
Mary's Law Journal).
97. UK RSFSR [Criminal Code of the RSFSR] art. 153 (1960), reprinted in THE SOVIET
CODES OF LAW 55-156 (William B. Simons ed., Harold J. Berman & James W. Spindler trans.,
1980).
98. GK RSFSR [Civil Code of the RSFSR] art. 111 (1964), reprinted in THE SOVIET
CODES OF LAW 391-541 (William B. Simons ed., A.K.R. Kiralfy trans., 1980). In response to
inadequacies in its Civil Code, most of which dates from 1964, the Supreme Soviet of the
Russian Federation recently adopted the USSR Fundamentals of Civil Legislation (adopted by
the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on May 31, 1991). Although these provisions never became
binding because of the failed coup and subsequent dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia has
adopted the provisions as a temporary solution pending the wholesale amendment of its own
Civil Code. Thus, restrictive provisions such as Article 111 of the Civil Code are now arguably
superseded by less "socialist" provisions.
99. Vedomosti RSFSR [Law on the Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises in
the RSFSR] art. 2, § 1 (July 3, 1991), reprintedin THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FED-
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An additional source of concern not only for new owners but for
the privatizers themselves is the fact that some state enterprises have
claimed that municipal property subject to privatization actually belongs to the state enterprise and not the local GKI or City Fund.
According to Mayor Bednyakov, several cases involving this claim
are being arbitrated but no final decision is yet available."°° The situation that has been encountered is the following: The local GKI may
have decided that a grocery located in a larger, multi-purpose building will be privatized. If a state enterprise "owned" the large building
pursuant to the Law on Property, the enterprise might claim that its
consent is required to privatize the grocery store. More likely still,
the enterprise might argue that it is owed the proceeds of
privatization.
Such a state enterprise would base its claim on Article 5, Section 2
and Article 30, Section 5 of the Law on Property, arguing that the
property being privatized by the local GKI belongs to it by right of
"complete economic control" (polnoe khozjastvennoe vedenyje)
granted under the Law on Property. The local GKI will, of course,
argue that the Law on Privatization and the State Property Division
Resolution effectively remove the building from the "complete ecoERATION, SMALL-SCALE PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA: THE NIZHNY NOVGOROD MODEL,
ANNEXES 2-12 (International Finance Corp. 1992) (allowing for governance of privatization

by legislation of the RSFSR). Article 29 of the Law on Privatization provides that the state
will "guarantee observance during privatization of the rights of sellers, buyers, their agents and
intermediaries." Id. art. 29. This provision undoubtedly relates, however, to the conduct of
the privatization process itself and not to the new property relations emerging from
privatization.
100. Interview with Dmitri Ivanovich Bednyakov, Mayor of the City of Nizhny
Novgorod, in Charlotte, N.C. (Oct. 15, 1992). This issue may become more pressing when
property of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union begins to be privatized. Much will
depend in this regard on the decision of the Constitutional Court of Russia concerning the
constitutionality of Yeltsin's August 1991 decree nationalizing the property of the Communist
Party. Communist Party property tends to be relatively quite valuable.
Another source of potentially conflicting claims to title may be claims based on pre-1917
ownership. The Law on Privatization specifically states that it "does not regulate restitution of
proprietary rights of owners, successors, and heirs with respect to those enterprises that were
nationalized, confiscated, or otherwise taken against the will of the initial owners ..
"
Vedomosti RSFSR [Law on the Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises in the
RSFSR] art. 2, § 3 (July 3, 1991), reprintedin THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, SMALL-SCALE PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA:

THE NIZHNY NOVGOROD MODEL, AN-

2-12 (International Finance Corp. 1992). Of course, the time that has passed since the
Bolshevik Revolution in comparison with the relative youth of the communist regimes in the
former German Democratic Republic or Hungary reduces the likelihood of such claims
arising.
NEXES
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nomic control" of the state enterprise by legislatively granting jurisdiction over it to the local GKI.10 ' Whatever the legal results of such
a dispute might be, the time and money spent in resolving such claims
will have a negative impact on the success of the reforms. °2
B.

Property Rights

Notwithstanding the contractual restrictions on the sale and use of
privatized property mentioned above-which may not be reproduced
in local privatization programs other than in Nizhny Novgorod 03 the traditional activities associated with ownership would seem to be
protected under existing legislation. 1" The problem facing a new
owner under existing legislation, however, is not so much whether the
practice can be envisioned, but whether old laws drafted under entirely different conditions can be adapted to the new property
relations.
101. See Vedomosti RSFSR [Law on the Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises
in the RSFSR] art. 6, § 1, art. 7, § 1 (July 3, 1991), reprintedin THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
RUSSIAN

FEDERATION,

SMALL-SCALE

PRIVATIZATION

IN

RUSSIA:

THE

NIZHNY

NOVGOROD MODEL, ANNEXES 2-12 (International Finance Corp. 1992) (making RSFSR
Property Fund sole seller of state assets to private sector).
102. According to Mayor Bednyakov, another unhappy variable in the problem is that
such claims will often be referred to the state arbitration bureaucracy, which has neither the
legal experience to examine such claims substantively on a case-by-case basis nor the reformminded outlook to resist the influence of powerful state enterprises. The situation may have to
be clarified through additional legislation. Interview with Dmitri Ivanovich Bednyakov,
Mayor of the City of Nizhny Novgorod, in Charlotte, N.C. (Oct. 15, 1992).
103. One can question whether those contractual restrictions themselves would be enforceable in light of Article 32, Section 1 of the Law on Property. See Vedomosti RSFSR
[Law on Property in the RSFSR] art. 32, § 1 (Dec. 24, 1990), reprinted in THE PARKER
SCHOOL OF FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE LAW, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, RUSSIA AND THE

REPUBLICS-LEGAL MATERIALS (John N. Hazard & Vratislav Pechota eds., 1992) (providing
that an act contradictory to the Law on Property may be recognized as invalid in court upon
motion of injured party).
104. See id. art. 7. (containing provisions relating to sale of property); id. art. 9, § 2 (protecting right to inheritance). The Civil Code regulates certain aspects of the pledging of property, of debtor and creditor relations, and of the sale of property. GK RSFSR [Civil Code of
the RSFSR] arts. 186-236 (1964), reprintedin, THE SOVIET CODES OF LAW 391-541 (William
B. Simons ed., A.K.R. Kiralfy trans., 1980). Article 10 of the April 22 Resolution crossreferences generally the "legislation of the Russian Federation" for questions both of inheritance as well as the sale of property acquired through privatization. Presidium of the Nizhny
Novgorod City Council, Res. No. 53 [Concerning the Privatization of Retail Shops, Catering
Facilities, and Consumer Services in Nizhny Novgorod in 1992] art. 10, § 10.4 (Apr. 22, 1992),
reprintedin THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, SMALL-SCALE PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA: THE NIZHNY NOVGOROD MODEL, ANNEXES 104-10 (International Finance
Corp. 1992).
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Chichikov's hopes for raising money with his dead souls provide a
representative example of this kind of problem. The pledge provisions
of the Civil Code, adopted when almost all property belonged to the
state, never envisioned the possibility that an individual would pledge
the assets of one restaurant in order to raise the cash to establish another restaurant. Russian legislators, realizing that such a problem
could hinder the ability of Russian property owners to obtain credit,
adopted a new law on pledging and secured transactions in May
1992.'05 The Law on Pledge, while untried and probably insufficient
in some ways, addresses the specific issue of secured transactions in a
comprehensive manner that the Russian Civil Code does not even
attempt.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the new owner wants to be
assured that his property cannot be expropriated or nationalized by
the government without appropriate protections and compensation.
The Law on Property is rather weak in this regard, leaving such a
possibility open, although providing a statutory basis for compensation.106 Article 20 of the Law on Enterprises and Entrepreneurial Activity provides additional statutory protection against an illegal taking
of an enterprise's property. It also explicitly prohibits the state from
interfering in the legal activities of enterprises.1 "7 Statutory protections certainly give comfort but, were the occasion of an expropriation
or nationalization to arise, the owner of what formerly had been state
property would have to enforce her rights in the courts or through
arbitration. The weaknesses of the judicial system have already been
indicated.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Nor does it seem that much cunning was required to fabricate the
sledge or carriage drawn by those three horses; it was improvised with
105. Law on Pledge of the Russian Federation, No. 2972-1 (May 29, 1992) (on file with
St. Mary's Law Journal).
106. Vedomosti RSFSR [Law on Property in the RSFSR] art. 31 (Dec. 24, 1990), reprinted in THE PARKER SCHOOL OF FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE LAW, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, RUSSIA AND THE REPUBLICS-LEGAL MATERIALS (John N. Hazard & Vratislav

Pechota eds., 1992).
107. Vedomosti RSFSR [Law on Enterprises and Entrepreneurial Activity] art. 20, § 2
(Dec. 25, 1990), reprinted in THE PARKER SCHOOL OF FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE LAW,
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, RUSSIA AND THE REPUBLICS-LEGAL MATERIALS

(John N. Haz-

ard & Vratislav Pechota eds., 1992).
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the help of an axe and a drill by some handy Jaroslavl peasant. Your
driver wears no great top boots of foreign make: he is all beard and
mittens, and sits perched on his seat the devil knows how; but when he
stands up, cracks his whip and starts up a song, then the horses rush
like a hurricane .... 108
The Russian government has received significant foreign assistance
in drafting the laws governing the privatization program. Much of
the assistance has come in the form of technical aid programs from
institutions such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank and International Finance Corporation. The Russians have also paid foreign advisers, such as law firms
and investment banks. Notwithstanding the foreign involvement, the
speed with which the laws have been prepared and the specific context
within which privatization has developed, have caused some to view
the privatization program as "improvised with the help of an axe and
a drill by some handy Jaroslavl peasant."
Nonetheless, the privatization program has successfully transferred
a significant amount of former state property into the hands of the
private sector. The Russian government has begun to expand the program into new sectors, including land auctions and the auctions of
equipment used in certain heavy industries, such as trucks."0 9 Potential restrictions on the use of property and the ability to defend title
are areas of significant concern for all new property owners. The
points raised in Part V above are no more than a brief adumbration of
the kinds of problems that could arise.
Major pieces of the privatization puzzle-in many ways the most
complicated and difficult-to-structure pieces-must yet be fit together.
Still, as this article has shown, substantial progress has been made in
the area of small-scale privatizations involving Russian buyers. Medium-scale and certainly the large-scale privatizations will require foreign involvement to achieve the necessary capital requirements.
In a very short period, the Russian government and the GKI have
developed a rational and reasonably effective system to transfer ownership from the state to private entrepreneurs. The system appears to
allocate property rights and jurisdiction in a manner that may be

108. NIKOLAI GOGOL, DEAD SouLs 304-05 (George Reavey trans., 1971).
109. Russia Auctions Some Property to Individuals, WALL ST. J., Nov. 2, 1992, at A12,
col. 4; Truck Sale Ushers in Voucher Privatizationsfor Russians, FINANCIAL TIMES, Nov. 2,
1992, at 16, col. 1.
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traced, thus providing at least a minimum of certainty for buyers.
Still, the inconsistencies and gaps in the current laws relating to property and the new property relations achieved through privatization
must be addressed. This need will become especially acute as more
and more foreigners participate in privatization transactions."'

110. In addition, new areas must be brought into play in future medium- and large-scale
privatizations. For example, the current laws and regulations on privatization do not make
environmental concerns at all a part of the decision-making process. Yet, funding from multilateral investment and development banks such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development or the World Bank may require an environmental showing in order to receive
funding. See Chris A. Wold & Durwood Zaelke, PromotingSustainable Development and Democracy in Centraland Eastern Europe: The Role of the European Bank for Reconstruction &
Development, 7 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 559, 572 (1992) (discussing creation of "environmental veto" allowing for rejection of projects causing major environmental problems).
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